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ABSTRACT: On other occasions I have argued that ‘informal logic’ should not really be 
seen as a kind of ‘weak’ form of logic, but rather as ‘applied epistemology.’ This 
categorization is intended to create an analogy with applied ethics. Applied ethics has 
created a robust research project and stimulated ethical thinking both in and outside 
philosophy. As with applied ethics, I believe that as philosophers explore the actual 
application of their principles and theories (ethical or epistemological) they will discover 
new insights into the powers and limitations of their theories. Application is not just 
about philosophy being ‘useful,’ it is also an intellectual and theoretical challenge and to 
a discipline that often suffers from undo abstraction.  
In this paper, I will argue that those who are interested in philosophy of science 
and applied epistemology should look not at physics but at epidemiology for a model of 
how a ‘hard’ science actually establishes causal claims. Epidemiology is a very 
epistemologically self-conscious and highly successful science. It is not characterized by 
the over arching laws à la Newton, nor does the Popperian principle of falsifiability work 
at all well within the discipline. Falsification is as elusive as proof, not only because 
epidemiology is fundamentally a stochastic science, but also because no experiment is 
sufficiently conclusive to falsify a claim. No one, though, would deny the enormous 
success of epidemiology in contributing to both an understanding of and enhancement of 
human health. 
While research in epidemiology is characterized by the use of elaborate statistical 
methods, claims are not established simply by the ‘statistically significant’ results of 
particular studies or experiments. This claim may seem surprising to anyone who has 
looked at medical research. Most such research uses the mathematical tests developed in 
statistics to assess the likelihood that a result of the study is ‘real’ -- not merely a result of 
chance. But because of inevitable confounding factors and because few studies actually 
meet the random sampling criteria for the application of these statistical methods, 
researchers must still argue for the plausibility and significance of their results. When we 
observe the epistemological practices of epidemiology we see that a primary tool of this 
successful science is argumentation and judgement. Claims are established not by critical 
experiments or the confirmation of precise predictions, rather they are established (as 
they are in many sciences) by an evaluation of all relevant experimental and study results. 
 
Establishment of a causal claim typically involve arguments:  
 about quality and significance of results,  
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 that confounding factors were appropriately controlled,  
 by analogy from animal experiments, other lab experiments, and accepted 
biological models,  
 about the application of numerous epistemological norms 
 replying to counter-arguments and objections.  
 
Such sweeping characterization of a discipline is obviously hard to defend and I will 
not attempt to do so. What I will do in this paper is review a bit of the history of 
epistemological reflection in epidemiology, quote some reflective epidemiologists’ views 
about their discipline, review a classic paper in epidemiology which illustrates the central 
role of argumentation in epidemiology, and look at the current debate concerning the 
effects of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). 
In doing so I will make a prima facie case that applied epistemologists can both learn 
from and give advice to epidemiologists. For example: one of the interesting implications 
that emerges from my study about the nature of argument in epidemiology is the central 
role that judgement must play in the assessing of scientific claims. Unfortunately this 
provides considerable opportunity for bias. While the pernicious influence of bias is a 
problem in any discipline, the natural sciences, because of their emphasis on ‘letting the 
data speak for itself’, have been largely able to avoid the kind of influence that bias plays 
in say political ‘science’ or economics. But as the historic debate about the effects of 
smoking, the current debate around the so-called ‘passive smoking’ and recent 
pharmaceutical testing scandals illustrate, bias can be a crucial factor in epidemiological 
work. Fair-mindedness and a careful respect for the strength and problems of the 
research, despite one’s own views (or worse the views of one’s funders) is crucial in any 
discipline, but more so in one in which ‘judgement calls’ play a crucial role. Such 
observations have implications not only for constraints on scientific funding, but also for 
models of adjudication of scientific results. What evaluative weight, for example, should 
be given to the fact that research was funded by a manufacturer? How can we make 
appropriate use of a researcher’s statements of conflict of interest without slipping into 
the ad hominem fallacy? In concluding, I believe I have shown that epidemiology can be 
a valuable source of worthy philosophical problems for those philosophers interested in 
the application of epistemological principles in science. 
